Media Audience Concentration
Result: High Risk
This indicator aims to assess the concentration of audience and readership across media platforms based on audience share. Concentration is measured by using the Top4 concentration measure, which is most common in economical calculations.
Why?
This indicator assesses a HIGH risk to media pluralism in Serbia, due to high concentrations in TV, Print and Radio markets.
TV: 63.33%
The TV market in Serbia is highly concentrated as the 4 major owners reach the audience share of 63.33%. The market leader is the Public Broadcasting Service with its three TV stations (RTS 1, RTS 2 and RTV 1) it reaches 21.62% of the audience. Pink Media Group owned by Zeljko Mitrovic has an audience share of 17.84% with three of its Pink TV stations, Pink 1,2 and 3. Former Antenna Group, now owned by Srdjan Milovanovic, a former owner of Kopernikus cable system, has two major TV stations in Serbia – O2 and Prva TV, through which it reaches 15.72% of the audience. The audience share of Happy TV, owned by Predrag Rankovic, amounts to 8.15%.
*The share of top 10 television stations represents 63.88% of the audience share of which 63.33% is attributed to the top 4 players of the market.
Radio: 52.3%
The risk of concentration in the radio market is assessed as high with the four major owners reaching 52.3% of radio audience shares. Zoran Andjelkovic’s S Media Team (15.8%), Milos Krdzic’s Maxim Media Group (17.1%), PBS (9%) and Srdjan Milovanovic’s Kopernikus Corporation (10.4%) are the four major players in the radio market.
*The top 14 radio stations in Serbia represent an audience share of 63.5% of which four players control 52.9% which indicates a high concentration.
Print: 71.08%
The print market in Serbia is highly concentrated as four major owners reach an audience share of 71.08%. The market leader is the Swiss-German corporation Ringier Axel Springer Media which has an audience of 20.37% with two of its newspapers (Blic and weekly Nin). It is closely followed by Insajder Tim (Informer) with audience share of 17.4%. Government owned Kompanija Novosti (Vecernje Novosti) and Politika AD have audience share of 20.86%. Whereas Adria Media Group, now owned by Igor Zezelj connected with Telekom Srbija and Mondo portal, with daily Kurir have an audience share of 12.43%.
| Low | Medium | High |
|---|---|---|
| Audience Concentration in Television | ||
Percentage: 63.33%
| ||
| If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%. |
| Audience Concentration in Radio | ||
Percentage: 52.3%
| ||
| If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%. |
| Audience Concentration in Print | ||
Percentage: 71.08%
| ||
| If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%. |
Media Market Concentration
Result: No data
This indicator aims to assess the horizontal concentration in the media market based on market share which illustrates the economic power of companies/ groups. Concentration is measured for each media sector by adding the market shares of the major owners in the sector.
Result: Unknown
Although Serbian Business Register’s Agency provides financial information on revenues, no financial information is available on the media market as a whole therefore market share for companies studied is unknown. Hence media ownership concentration based on market share could not be computed. In accordance with the MOM methodology if the country presents data on audience, but not on revenues/market share: the market share data is excluded from the analysis, i.e., the findings are based on the audience data alone and the revenue data are considered optional.
| LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH |
|---|---|---|
| Media Market Concentration in Television (horizontal) | ||
| Percentage: not assessed | ||
| If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%. |
| Media Market Concentration in Radio (horizontal) | ||
| Percentage: not assessed | ||
| If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%. |
| Media Market Concentration in Print (horizontal) | ||
| Percentage: not assessed | ||
| If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%. |
| Media Market Concentration in Internet Content Providers | ||
| Percentage: not assessed | ||
| If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%. |
Regulatory Safeguards: Media Ownership Concentration
Result: Medium
This indicator assesses the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high horizontal concentration in the of ownership and/or control in the different media.
Score: 14 out of 20 (70%)
Result: Regulatory safeguards to prevent media ownership concentration are in place, yet the implementation of those safeguards remains problematic. This indicator assesses a MEDIUM risk.
Why?
All media in Serbia are regulated by The Law on Public Information and Media. The difference is in authorities which are responsible to control their activities and in the register where their ownership data is stored. Radio and TV are electronic media, and they are under specific regime of Lex specialis - The law on electronic media. REM – is the responsible regulatory authority for Television and Radio broadcasting.
Print and Online are under control of the Ministry of Culture and Information and they are obliged to inform Media register in the Serbian business registers agency about every change in the ownership structure.
There is no law that specifically regulates internet portals as a separate form of media, but general legal provisions of the Law on Public Information and Media apply to the internet media.
LPIM regulates horizontal media concentration by restricting ownership and managerial rights, applying the criteria of circulation for print media (50%) and ratings for electronic media (35%). The Republic of Serbia also has a Law on Protection of Competition (LPC), which regulates this field in detail and applies to all natural and legal persons in the Republic of Serbia, including media owners.
The Ministry and the Regulatory Authority are in charge of overseeing concentration and monopoly in the media. However, looking at the structure of the media in Serbia, the threshold is set so high that it is practically impossible to exceed the current limit of 35% of total combined ratings, that is, 50% of total annual circulation, so this form of monitoring is mostly of little importance, without any concrete effects and presents the biggest weakness of the current media legislation in Serbia.
| Table summarizes TV/Radio - Max. score: 4 per sector. | Description | Yes | No | NA | MD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds or limits, based on objective criteria (e.g. number of licenses, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue) to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in this sector? | This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration in the media and/or control in the TELEVISION/RADIO sector. | 1 | |||
| Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the print sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)? | This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration. | 1 | |||
| Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds? | The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as: - Refusal of additional licences; - Blocking of a merger or acquisition; - Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; - Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors; - divestiture. | 0.5 | |||
| Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used? | This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of sector-specific remedies against a high horizontal concentrationin the media and/or control in the television media. | 0.5 | |||
| Total: | 3 |
| PRINT - Max. score: 4 | Description | Yes | No | NA | MD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds or limits, based on objective criteria (e.g. number of licenses, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue) to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in this sector? | This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration in the media and/or control in the PRINT sector. | 1 | |||
| Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the print sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)? | This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration. | 1 | |||
| Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds? | The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as: - Refusal of additional licences; - Blocking of a merger or acquisition; - Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; - Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors; - divestiture. | 0.5 | |||
| Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used? | This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of sector-specific remedies against a high horizontal concentrationin the media and/or control in the television media. | 0.5 | |||
| Total: | 3 |
| Internet - Max. score: 4 | Description | Yes | No | NA | MD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds or limits, based on objective criteria (e.g. number of licenses, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue) to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in this sector? | This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration in the media and/or control in the ONLINE sector. | 0.5 | |||
| Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the print sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)? | This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration. | 0.5 | |||
| Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds? | The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as: - Refusal of additional licences; - Blocking of a merger or acquisition; - Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; - Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors; - divestiture. | 0.5 | |||
| Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used? | This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of sector-specific remedies against a high horizontal concentrationin the media and/or control in the television media. | 0.5 | |||
| Total: | 2.00 |
| Media Mergers | Description | Yes | No | NA | MD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Can a high level of horizontal of ownership and/or control in the media sector be prevented via merger control/competition rules that take into account the specificities of the media sector? | This question aims to access the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector specific and/or competition law) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the media sector through merging operations: - By containing media-specific provision that impose stricter thresholds than in other sectors; - The mandatory intervention of a media authority in merger and acquisition cases (for instance, the obligation for the competition authority to ask the advice of the media authority); - The possibility to overrule the approval of a concentration by the communication authority for reasons of media pluralism (or public interest in general), that - even tough they do not contain media-specific provisions - do not exclude the media sector from their scope of application. | 1 | |||
| Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the print sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)? | This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system. | 1 | |||
| Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds? | The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as: - Blocking of a merger or acquisition; - Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; - Obligation to give up licences / activities in other media sectors; - divestiture. | 0.5 | |||
| Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used? | This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of sector-specific remedies against a high horizontal concentrationin the media and/or control in the television media. | 0.5 | |||
| Total: | 3 |
Law on Protection of Competition
(Official Gazette 51/2009 and 95/2013)
Cross-Media Ownership Concentration
Result: High Risk
This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership in the different sectors – television, newspapers, audio, and any other relevant media – of the media industry (cross-media). Concentration is measured by using the Top8 concentration measure.
Result: This indicator assesses the cross-media concentration as high and therefore, the risk to media pluralism is High.
Why?
Top 8 owners across all media sectors have an audience share of 74.88% which according to MOM methodology is high concentration. It is fair to presume that the number is even higher, having in mind that online audience shares are not measured. Government, through PBS and ownership in print media is the only owner active in all four media sectors. Private owners tend to separate between sectors. Major owners of TV outlets incline to have radio outlets as well, whereas publishers of print media tend to have online editions of their outlets. Television remains the most consumed media, radio and print are in decline whereas internet is growing in importance virtually all across the globe and Serbia is no exception. Top 8 owners are: Government and Public Broadcasting Service (36.88%), Pink Media Group (16.89%), Kopernikus Corporation (19.91%), Ringier Axel Springer Media (12.22%), Insajder Tim (10.45%), Maxim Media Group (9.74%), S Media Team (9%) and Adria Media Group (7.45%).
Audience shares are weighted against media consumption data provided by Ipsos for the 2018. Average daily reach for TV is 89,6%, Print - 60,6%, Radio – 57,42%. Since no audience shares were available for internet (only number of visits) companies’ online outlets were not measured in.
Score: 74.88%
| LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH |
|---|---|---|
Pink Media Group: TV: Pink, Pink 2, Pink 3 = 17.84% Radio: Radio Pink = 1.78%, Online pink.rs Kopernikus Corporation: TV: =O2, Prva TV = 15.72%; Radio: Play Radio = 10.4%; Online: b92.net, prva.rs Ringier Axel Springer Media: Print: Blic, Nin = 20.37%; Online: blic.rs, nin.rs Insajder Tim: Print: Informer = 17.42%; Online: Informer.rs Maxim Media Group: Radio: TDI, Hit FM, Karolina = 11.9% Adria Media Group: Print: Kurir = 12.42%; Online: kurir.rs, espresso.rs | ||
| If within one country the major 8 owners (Top8) have a market share below 50% across the different media sectors. | If within one country the major 8 owners (Top8) have an audience share between 50% and 69% across the different media sectors. | If within one country the major 8 owners (Top8) have a market share above 70% across the different media sectors. |
Regulatory Safeguards: Cross-Media Ownership Concentration
Result: Medium
This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high degree of cross-ownership between media types (press, TV, radio, internet). Given the diversity of thresholds or limits that exist among different countries with regard to ownership and/or control, 'high' should be assessed according to the standards of your country and in the light of the thresholds or limits imposed by domestic laws.
Why?
Score: 5 out of 8 (62.5%)
Vertical concentration is regulated in a similar way as horizontal concentration, when sanctioning powers, threshold and authorities are concerned. As the concentration thresholds are set too high the same problem is observed here, that it is practically impossible to reach concentration. Generally vertical concentration by one company is prohibited but the law allows ownership in another type of media or in distribution through an affiliated legal person. So today in Serbia one can observe a situation where the biggest cable provider (SBB) is also an owner of a TV station N1 and Nova S (owned by United Group) while Telekom Srbija owns 5 sports TV channels. The regulation for concentration prevention exists but is not effectively enforced. Therefore, the risk to Cross-Media Ownership Concentration is rated as Medium.
| CROSS-MEDIA OWNERSHIP | Description | Yes | No | NA | MD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds, based on objective criteria, such as number of licences, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue, to prevent a high degree of cross-ownership between the different media? | This indicator aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high degree of cross-ownership in different media sectors. | 1 | |||
| Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with these thresholds and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media authority=1, competition authority=0,5)) | This variable aims to assess if the law / regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration. | 1 | |||
| Does the law grant body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds? | This variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as: - Refusal of additional licenses; - Blocking of a merger or acquisition; - Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; - Obligation to give up licenses / activities in other media sectors; - divestiture. | 0.5 | |||
| Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used? | The relevant authority never uses its sanctioning powers. The question aims at assessing the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the regulation. | 0.5 | |||
Can a high degree of cross-ownership between different media be prevented via merger control/competition rules that take into account the specificities of the media sector?
| For instance, cross-ownership can be prevented by competition law: - by the mandatory intervention of a media authority in M&A cases (for instance, the obligation for the competition authority to ask the advice of the media authority); - by the possibility to overrule the approval of a concentration by the competition authority for reasons of media pluralism (or Public interest in general); Even though the law does not contain media-specific provisions - it does not exclude the media sector from its scope of application | 0.5 | |||
| Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with these rules and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority) | This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation against a high degree of cross-ownership in different media sectors via merger control/competition rules | 0.5 | |||
| Does the law grant body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds? | Examples sanctioning/enforcement powers and remedies: - blocking of a merger or acquisition; - obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; - must carry obligation to give up licenses/activities in other media sectors ; - divestiture. | 0.5 | |||
| Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used? | The question aims at assessing the effectiveness of the remedies of the regulation. | 0.5 | |||
| Total (Mean of L-e und L-I sub-indicators) | 5 |
Law on Protection of Competition
(Official Gazette 51/2009 and 95/2013)
Ownership Transparency
Result: Medium
This indicator assesses the transparency of data about the political affiliations of media owners as ownership transparency is a crucial precondition to enforce media pluralism.
Result: Companies registered in the Serbia have to report their ownership structures and relevant changes to the Serbian Business Register’s Agency, which is publicly accessible. Ownership transparency in Serbia is rated as MEDIUM.
Why?
Why?
Our sample includes 10 Television outlets, 10 Radio, 14 Print editions and 10 Online outlets, in total 44 media outlets. In 70% of cases Data was Publicly available, i.e. traceable in public records. 18.18% of outlets were Actively Transparent and in 11.82% of cases ownership was not transparent – Data was deemed Unavailable.
- For the majority – 31 - of the media outlets and related companies, ownership data was at least publicly available at the Serbian Business Register’s Agency.
- 8 media outlets were rated as actively transparent more than half of which belong to the PBS, which is legally obliged to inform the public proactively and comprehensively about its ownership. 5 outlets (3 TV and 2 Radio) belong to the Public Broadcasting Service. 3 remaining outlets are print and online outlets that belong to the Swiss-German Ringier Axel Springer Media.
- 5 outlets were rated as data unavailable – ownership could not be raced in the public records.
- No company actively disguised the ownership structure, e. g. through bogus companies.
| LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH |
|---|---|---|
| How would you assess the transparency and accessibility of data about the media ownership? | ||
Data on media owners as well as their political affiliations is publicly available and transparent. (Active Transparency) Code if that applies to > 75% of the sample. | Data of media owners and their political affiliations are disclosed based on investigations of journalists and media activists or upon request. (Passive Transparency, Data Publicly Available) Code if that applies to > 50% of the sample. | Data on political affiliation of media owners are not easily accessible the public and investigative journalists or activists are not successful in disclosing these data. (Data Unavailable, Active Disguise) Code if data is available for < 50% of the sample. |
Considering the answers, distinguish the following levels of transparency:
| Sample | Transparency Level | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 8 of 44 | Active Transparency | company/channel informs proactively and comprehensively about its ownership, data is constantly updated and easily verifiable |
| 0 of 44 | Passive Transparency | upon request, ownership data is easily available from the company/channel |
| 31 of 44 | Data Publicly Available | ownership data is easily available from other sources, e.g. public registries etc. |
| 5 of 44 | Data Unavailable | ownership data is not publicly available, company/channel denies the release of information or does not respond, no public record exists. |
| 0 of 44 | Active Disguise | in addition to unavailability of true data, ownership is disguised, e.g. through bogus companies, etc. |
Regulatory Safeguards: Ownership Transparency
Result: Low
This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of transparency and disclosure provisions with regard to media ownership and/or control.
Why?
Score: 16 out of 20 = 80%
- Under the Law on Public Information and Media, the media are obliged to provide on their website or in their print edition information on their publisher. Under the law, failure to do so is an offense so a fine of RSD 100,000 to RSD 1,000,000 (approx. USD 898.00 to USD 8.983.00) will be imposed on a legal person – publisher if it fails to publish the imprint.
- The media are obliged to report to the Register of Media any/all changes of publisher within 15 days of the day the change occurred. If they do not do it, they can be sanctioned by RSD 100.000 (USD 898.00) till RSD 1.000.000 (USD 8.983.00) as well. The director of the publisher can be sanctioned with a fine of RSD 10.000 (USD 8.98) till RSD 100.000 (USD 898.00).
| Transparency Provisions (summarized for TV, Radio, Press, Online - max. score 5 per sector) | Description | Yes | No | NA | MD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Does national (media, company, tax...) law contain transparency and disclosure provisions obliging media companies to publish their ownership structures on their website or in records/documents that are accessible to the public? | The aim of the question is to check regulatory safeguard for transparency towards the citizens, the users and the public in general. | 1 | |||
| Does national (media, company, tax...) law contain transparency and disclosure provisionsobliging media companies to report (changes in) ownership structures to public authorities (such as the media authority)? | The aim of the question is to check regulatory safeguard for accountability and transparency towards public authorities. | 1 | |||
| Is there an obligation by national law to discloserelevant information after every change in ownership structure? | This question aims at assessing if the law provides rules on the public availability of accurate and up-to-date data on media ownership. This is a condition for an effective transparency. | 1 | |||
| Are there any sanctions in case of non-respect of disclosure obligations? | This question aims at assessing if the law on media ownership transparency can be enforced through the application of sanctions. | 0.5 | |||
| Do the obligations ensure that the public knows which legal or natural person effectively owns or controls the media company? | This question aim at assessing the effectiveness of the laws that deal with media ownership transparency and if they succeed in disclosing the real owners of the media outlets. | Medium: some owners are still unknown (=0,5) | 0.5 | ||
| Total | 16 out of 20 | ||||
(Political) Control Over Media Outlets and Distribution Networks
Result: Medium
This indicator assesses the risk of political affiliations and control over media and distribution networks. It also assesses the level of discrimination by politically affiliated media distribution networks. Discriminatory actions would for example include unfavorable pricing and posing barriers to media accessing the distribution channel. Political Affiliations means that the media outlet or company belongs to a party, a partisan group, a party leader or a clearly partisan person.
Why?
Political affiliations of media owners
TV: 55.18%
8 out of 10 Television outlets in our sample are owned/controlled by individuals with known political affiliations. These are outlets that belong to 3 owners Public Broadcasting Service (RTS1, RTS2, RTV1 = 21.62%) Pink Media Group (Pink, Pink2, Pink 3 = 17.84%) and Srdjan Milovanovic, new owner of O2 and TV Prva (O2, TV Prva = 15.72%)
- Although Public Broadcasting Service is supposed to be serving the best interests of the public its organizational structure and decision-making boards are comprised of and even overpopulated by people close to the ruling SNS party resulting in politicization of its outlets.
- Pink Media Group is owned by Zeljko Mitrovic who entered the media business in the 1990s which was tightly controlled by the ruling couple, Slobodan Milosevic and Mirjana Markovic. Keeping close ties with all the governments that formed since then he ensured stable growth for his media business which spread beyond the borders of Serbia into the Balkan region at large.
- Srdjan Milovanovic recently bought national TV stations O2 and TV Prva. He is brother of Zvezdan Milovanovic, a SNS delegate in Nis, and also a former owner of Kopernikus Cable System located in same Serbian town. Milovanovic acquired money for acquisition of two national TV stations by selling his shares in Kopernikus to Telekom Srbija.
Radio: 54%
11 out of 14 Radio outlets sample are owned/controlled by individuals with known political affiliations.
- These are S Media (Radio S, Radio S2 and Radio S3= 15.8%) owned by Zoran Andjelkovic former Member of the Parliament and currently a high-ranked member of the Socialist Party; Maxim Media (Hit FM, TDI, Karolina and JAT = 17.1%) owned by Milos Krdzic (The Krdzic family has ties to ruling party. They caught attention of the public after the privatization of Studio B); Public Broadcasting Service (Radio Belgrade 1 and Radio 202 = 9%), Srdjan Milovanovic (Play Radio =10.4%) and Pink Media Group (Pink Radio = 1.7) owned by Zeljko Mitrovic (see above).
Print: 70 %
8 out of 14 print outlets in our sample are owned/controlled by individuals with known political affiliations.
- Insajder Tim (Informer – 17.42%) owned by Dragan Vucicevic is a big supporter of the ruling party and his outlets provide a platform for direct attacks and smear campaigns on any critical voices.
- Adria Media Group (Kurir – 12.43%), although has a new owner, Igor Zezelj, has strong editorial policy supportive to rulling party. On top of that, Igor Zezelj is connected to Mondo portal, founded by state owned Telekom Srbija.
- Vecernje Novosti (13.42% of audience share) and Politika (7.44% of audience share) among the oldest papers with quality journalism were not successfully privatized with their privatized shares frozen and their ownerships intransparent. The papers are practically state controlled, which has significant stakes in the newspapers.
- Alo! (10.15%), a tabloid oriented daily, is owned by Sasa Blagojevic. He is also and owner of Belgrade – based TV Studio B, and has maintains close ties to the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Editorial policy of both media is clearly pro-government.
- Editorial policy in Srpski Telegraf (6.76%) owned by Medijska Mreza (owned by a group of people) suggests close political affiliation as the paper regularly attacks voices from the opposition and critics of the government.
- Ownership of Pecat (1.99%), weekly newspaper is intransparent but its editorial policy indicates close affinity to the ruling elite. Aleksandar Vulin, former editor of Pecat, is close to the president of Serbian Progressive Party, Aleksandar Vucic and is now the Minister of Labour.
- The owner of weekly Ekspres (0.39%) is Goran Veselinovic who was the best man of Aleksandar Vucic on his wedding. Veselinovic also owns a PR agency ‘Right’ which had taken over the most of the marketing businesses in Serbia since 2012 when Vucic's Serbian Progressive Party came to power.
Online: unknown. 8 out of 12 outlets in our sample are owned/controlled by the individuals with known political affiliations. Since no audience shares are available for online outlets we couldn’t compute the total audience shares of outlets controlled by politically affiliated entities.
| LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH |
|---|---|---|
| POLITICISATION OF MEDIA OUTLETS | ||
What is the share of TV media owned by politically affiliated entities? Percentage: 55.18% | ||
| The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having <50% - >30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. |
What is the share of Radio channels owned by politically affiliated entities? Percentage: 48.2%. | ||
| The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having <50%>30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. |
What is the share of Newspapers owned by politically affiliated entities? Percentage: 69.05% | ||
| The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having <50%>30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. |
What is the share of Online media owned by politically affiliated entities? Percentage: unknown (8 out of 12 outlets) | ||
| The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having <50%>30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. |
Result 2: Medium
Politicisation of leading distribution networks
Politicisation of leading distribution networks is rated as medium, mostly due to cable TV and internet providers, where partially state-owned company Telekom has a significant influence on provision of services. In print, there is no evidence for political affiliations of distributors, as this part of media sector puts more emphasis on business and economic prospects, rather than political.
- Some 75% of Serbian population has access to TV channels through cable distribution. Major cable operators are SBB (part of United Group) and Telekom (state owned). The biggest provider is SBB taking 54% of cable market, and its dominating position is often challenged with monopoly rules. These cable operators are in vague legal position with regards to vertical concentration, as they all provide content production and distribution. United Group is the owner of news TV channel N1, while Telekom has 5 sport channels under Arena sport package.
- During the 2018 and 2019 both operators entered a market race – United Group started to spread regionally buying TV stations and cable operators across the Balkan region, while Telekom entered a so called “Million plus” endeavour, acquiring smaller cable operators across Serbia such as Kopernikus, Radijus vektor, Avcom and Masko. Former owner of Kopernikus used the money acquired in Telekom transaction to become owner of national TV stations O2 and Prva TV. The owner has also a known political ties to ruling SNS party.
- Radio and TV frequencies are managed by an independent body, RATEL, in charge of frequency allocation. ETV is created as public enterprise to manage digital TV channels. There were no cases of discriminatory actions by either of these institutions.
- In addition to providing cable, Telekom also plays important role in providing infrastructure for Internet distribution. The company is promoter of introduction of 5G network in Serbia, along with Chinese Huawei. Being partially state owned makes Telekom prone to political influences. Other mobile and cable operators also provide internet services.
- Major print distributors include companies Beokolp, Centrosinergija, Futura plus, Global press, Stampa sistem, Trag press etc. No links to political structures were identified.
| LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH |
|---|---|---|
| How would you assess the conduct of the leading distribution networks for print media? | ||
| Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions. | At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions. | All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions. |
| How would you assess the conduct of the leading radio distribution networks? | ||
| Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions. | At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions. | All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions. |
| How would you assess the conduct of the leading television distribution networks? | ||
| Leading distribution, are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions. | At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions. | All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions. |
| How would you assess the conduct of the leading Internet distribution networks? | ||
| Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions. | At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions. | All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions. |
(Political) Control Over Media Funding
Result: High
This indicator assesses the influence of the state on the functioning of the media market, focusing particularly on the risk of discrimination in the distribution of state advertisements. The discrimination can be reflected in favoritism towards political parties or affiliates of political parties in the government, or in penalization of media criticizing the government. State advertising is understood as any advertising paid by governments (national, regional, local) and state-owned institutions and companies.
Result: The overall level of influence on media outlets through allocation of state advertising budgets is assessed as HIGH RISK to media pluralism.
Why?
There is no official, centralized or fully public data on allocation of state advertising budget, making it one of the least transparent aspects of Serbian media market. Due to its potential to corruptive practices, state advertising was subject of a research carried out by the State Anti-Corruption Council. In its 2015 report Council found out that more than 60 million EUR were spent by 124 sampled state institutions between 2011 and 2014, additionally emphasizing that current model of public procurements of advertising services hasn’t improved transparency, competition or efficiency in allocation of state advertising budget.
State advertising is regulated by 2016 Advertising Law, which prescribes several anti-discrimination measures. Additionally, the Law on Public Information and Media prescribes that all state allocations to media should be recorded in Media Register (operationally run by Serbian Business Registry Agency), but this type of budgetary spending is not visible in current display of the Register.
| LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH |
|---|---|---|
| Is the state advertising distributed to media proportionately to their audience share? Missing Data | ||
| State advertising is distributed to the media relatively proportionately to the audience shares of media. | State advertising is distributed disproportionately (in terms of audience share) to the media. | State advertising is distributed exclusively to few media outlets, which do not cover al major media outlets in the country. |
| How would you assess the rules of distribution of state advertising? | ||
| State advertising is distributed to media outlets based on transparent rules. | State advertising is distributed to media outlets based on a set of rules but it is unclear whether they are transparent. | There are no rules regarding distribution of state advertising to media outlets or these. |
| IMPORTANCE OF STATE ADVERTISING | ||
What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall TV / Radio / Print/ online advertising market? VALUE: There is no data available on the share of state advertising in the market. | ||
| Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall market. | Share of state advertising is 5%-10% of the overall market. | Share of state advertising is > 10% of the overall market.· |
(Political) Control Over News Agencies
Result: Medium
This indicator assesses the range and independence of competing news agencies, including the assessment of the level of state ownership and level of independence of state owned news agencies.
Result: The political control over news agencies is ranked as MEDIUM risk to media pluralism.
Why?
There is no market data for news agencies. There are three major, national news agencies registered in Serbia. Two of them, Beta and Fonet, are privately owned, founded in the 90’s as alternative sources of information during Milosevic era. The third news agency, Tanjug, was one of the oldest media in Serbia, founded back in 1943, and being state owned ever since privatization in 2014. Tanjug has undergone some unsuccessful privatization process, however, remained on market (semi-legally), in spite of numerous calls of media professionals calling it an unfair competition on the market. Current Ministry of Culture and Information announced to be seeking for acceptable legal mechanisms to put Tanjug back under state auspices.
| LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH |
|---|---|---|
What is the market share of the leading news agency? VALUE: There is no market share for news agencies available. | ||
| No news agency dominates the market (occupy >30% of the market of news agencies). | One news agency has <50% ≥30% share of the market of news agencies. | The leading news agency has ≥50% market share. |
| How would you evaluate the political affiliation and/or dependence of the largest news agency? | ||
| None of the largest news agencies is dependent on political groupings in terms of ownership, affiliation of key personnel or editorial policy. | At least one of the largest news agencies is dependent on political groupings in terms of ownership, affiliation of key personnel or editorial policy. | Most or all of the largest news agencies is dependent on political groupings in terms of ownership, affiliation of key personnel or editorial policy. |
